International Monetary Fund

Data cited at: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), The International Monetary Fund. The Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) is a voluntary data collection exercise conducted under the auspices of the IMF. An economy provides data on its holdings of portfolio investment securities (data are separately requested for equity and investment fund shares, long-term debt instruments, and short-term debt instruments).   Worldwide portfolio holdings of equity and investment fund shares (31 USD trillion) at end-2017 surpasses holdings of debt securities (29.7 USD trillion). After the peak of the financial crisis in 2008, the annual growth rate of equity holdings has exceeded substantially that for debt securities holdings. That pattern is similar in all the economies with the largest cross border portfolio assets and liabilities. As per G20 emerging economies, while the holdings of equity and investment fund shares had already been consistently higher than those of debt securities, during the last five years the gap has widened even further.

Commodity prices have declined sharply over the past three years, and output growth has slowed considerably among those emerging market and developing economies that are net exporters of commodities. A critical question for policymakers in these countries is whether commodity windfall gains and losses influence potential output or merely trigger transient fluctuations of actual output around an unchanged trend for potential output. The analysis in this chapter suggests that both actual and potential output move together with the commodity terms of trade but that actual output commoves twice as strongly as potential output. The weak commodity price outlook is estimated to subtract almost 1 percentage point annually from the average rate of economic growth in commodity exporters over 2015–17 as compared with 2012–14. In exporters of energy commodities, the drag is estimated to be larger: about 2¼ percentage points on average over the same period. The projected drag on the growth of potential output is about one-third of that for actual output.

This dataset covers only Cross-Country-Concepts - Portfolio Investment related indicators. Please visit  Principal Global Indicators - Data by Indicator  for other set of Principal Global Indicators. 

Global growth is projected at 3.1 percent in 2024 and 3.2 percent in 2025, with the 2024 forecast 0.2 percentage point higher than that in the October 2023 World Economic Outlook (WEO) on account of greater-than-expected resilience in the United States and several large emerging market and developing economies, as well as fiscal support in China. The forecast for 2024–25 is, however, below the historical (2000–19) average of 3.8 percent, with elevated central bank policy rates to fight inflation, a withdrawal of fiscal support amid high debt weighing on economic activity, and low underlying productivity growth. Inflation is falling faster than expected in most regions, in the midst of unwinding supply-side issues and restrictive monetary policy. Global headline inflation is expected to fall to 5.8 percent in 2024 and to 4.4 percent in 2025, with the 2025 forecast revised down.

The risks to global growth are broadly balanced and a soft landing is a possibilityGlobal growth is projected at 3.1 percent in 2024 and 3.2 percent in 2025, with the 2024 forecast 0.2 percentage point higher than that in the October 2023 World Economic Outlook (WEO) on account of greater-than-expected resilience in the United States and several large emerging market and developing economies, as well as fiscal support in China. The forecast for 2024–25 is, however, below the historical (2000–19) average of 3.8 percent, with elevated central bank policy rates to fight inflation, a withdrawal of fiscal support amid high debt weighing on economic activity, and low underlying productivity growth. Inflation is falling faster than expected in most regions, in the midst of unwinding supply-side issues and restrictive monetary policy. Global headline inflation is expected to fall to 5.8 percent in 2024 and to 4.4 percent in 2025, with the 2025 forecast revised down. With disinflation and steady growth, the likelihood of a hard landing has receded, and risks to global growth are broadly balanced. On the upside, faster disinflation could lead to further easing of financial conditions. Looser fiscal policy than necessary and than assumed in the projections could imply temporarily higher growth, but at the risk of a more costly adjustment later on. Stronger structural reform momentum could bolster productivity with positive cross-border spillovers. On the downside, new commodity price spikes from geopolitical shocks––including continued attacks in the Red Sea––and supply disruptions or more persistent underlying inflation could prolong tight monetary conditions. Deepening property sector woes in China or, elsewhere, a disruptive turn to tax hikes and spending cuts could also cause growth disappointments. Policymakers’ near-term challenge is to successfully manage the final descent of inflation to target, calibrating monetary policy in response to underlying inflation dynamics and—where wage and price pressures are clearly dissipating—adjusting to a less restrictive stance. At the same time, in many cases, with inflation declining and economies better able to absorb effects of fiscal tightening, a renewed focus on fiscal consolidation to rebuild budgetary capacity to deal with future shocks, raise revenue for new spending priorities, and curb the rise of public debt is needed. Targeted and carefully sequenced structural reforms would reinforce productivity growth and debt sustainability and accelerate convergence toward higher income levels. More efficient multilateral coordination is needed for, among other things, debt resolution, to avoid debt distress and create space for necessary investments, as well as to mitigate the effects of climate change.